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Abstract: This exploratory paper questions whether resilience
engineering is a realist or constructivist approach of safety. After a
présentation of two positions: critical realism and radical
constructivism, the authors explain how the frameworks provided by
thèse two positions were used in différent researches, answering
différent questions that arose during the work. For one, critical realism
offered an answer to the problem of the relationship between agency
and structure. For the other, radical constructivism afforded a good
définition of what models can be thought as. Both developments show
the relevance of taking into account of philosophical antécédents for
applied research and how this is valuable for resilience engineering
and the directions that could be pursued for future development.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the process of writing papers for a book gathering young researchers from the
field of accident and safety research (Svedung et al., 2008), we found ourselves
asking similar type of questions regarding human and social science. With
expérience from independent research projects conducted in, among other, civil
aviation and chemical industry, we hâve arrived at some similar questions regarding
the status of models applied in safety science. In this paper, we suggest to introduce
some of thèse questions and to see how they can provide an interesting point of view
on resilience engineering. The focus will be on the distinction between realist
positions and constructivist epistemologies. Before discussing the relevance of thèse
questions for resilience engineering, we will, in a first part, introduce the context in
which they emerged.
Resilience Engineering (Hollnagel 2006; 2008) has relatively rapidly emerged as an
approach to be reckoned with in relation to how we understand and manage safety
and vulnerability in socio-technical Systems. What makes the approach innovative
is, as described by Hollnagel in the introduction to the latter of the two resilience
books, not advances in applied methodology within the field but more the basic
System model it explicates related to the production of failures and successes in
socio-technical Systems. But can we however separate models from méthodologies
as it is asserted? Does a model not shape methodology? Does a methodology not
shape models? This is the type of concrète question that the philosophical
discussions (asking whether resilience engineering is realist or constructivist) hâve
led us to.
2. BACKGROUND
For one author, his expérience is mainly in the chemical and petrochemical industry,
and his empirical cases range from studies for research or consulting either
following accidents or for diagnosis of safety. His empirical works and subséquent
theoretical developments led him to deeper philosophical issues when questioning
the use of models in gênerai and their relationship with reality (Le Coze, 2005,
2008a, 2008b, Le Coze and Dupré, 2006). One of thèse questions, in relation to
assessing the level of reliability or resilience of organisations, was "how does the
past teach us lessons for the future""] Can models constructed from past expérience
be useful for predicting the future? Also, other philosophical issues were raised
when questioning the necessary interdisciplinary nature of safety research and the
difficulty of embracing the whole given the variety of disciplines that need to be
articulated. How do we get a global picture? Can we do so? Can we do it by
reducing phenomena to simple model, formula or principle (issue of reductionism in
science)? Ultimately, ail thèse questions led to a core one regarding the value of the
models for safety. In trying to find éléments of answers to thèse différent problems,
theoretical development on philosophy of complexity (Morin, 1977, 2007) and
constructivist theory of knowledge (Le Moigne, 1995, 2003, Glasersfeld, 1995,
2001) provided viable frameworks in which thèse issues fitted ail together.
For the other author, empirical research on safety and aircraft maintenance has led to
several questions regarding theory of social Systems and the relevance of currently
applied models for managing system performance (Pettersen 2008; Pettersen et al
2007). Among thèse questions is how to understand human action as part of socio-
technical system performance (McDonald & Morrison 2006a, McDonald &
Morrison 2006b). Approaching a possible answer has involved digging into
philosophical positions concerning the rôle of, and relationship between, human
agency and social structure. What are the alternative theoretical models of this
relationship? How can theory be applied to model how actions of aviation personnel
are enabled and constrained by the social system they are part of, also taking
account of the rôle of human intentionality in producing human actions? Within the
available philosophical discussions on to thèse topic, critical realism developed by
Bhaskar (1979) and further advanced by among other Archer (1995), is proving to
be a relevant framework for developing his research into a more consistent
articulation between philosophical assumptions, methodology and applied theory.
The aim of the first part of the paper is to elaborate on one of the questions
associated with thèse philosophical positions as it has not yet been treated much in
the field of safety science. This situation is probably linked with the philosophical
nature of the investigations required by the questions that we hâve. The aim of an
applied field of research such as safety science is not to produce philosophical
thoughts but to provide useful models and methods so that safety is concretely, in
the reality of industrial practices, enhanced. We however believe that any applied
scientific field also needs to ask itself where it stands in terms of commitments
rather than only concrète results. Avoiding methodological and ontological
questions is in fact a statement in itself and does not "save" an applied field of
research from its ontological and methodological commitments. Wilhout giving
définitive conclusions to the questions raised, we introduce the two related but
disiinctly différent philosophical developments that hâve proved to be useful l'or
addressing our questions concerning safety science perspectives: critical realism and
constructivist epistemologies. One of their main différences will be stated and
explored as support for a following discussion on resilience engineering, asking
whether resilience engineering is realist or constructivist. But first of ail, hère are
two présentations of critical realism and radical constructivism.
2.1 The relevance of the philosophy of science perspective for resilience
engineering
As indicated in the previous section, both our empirical and practical researches led
us back to theoretical questions. The type of questions philosophers, historians and
sociologists of science deal with (i.e. Soler, 2001, Andler et al, 2002, Barberousse et
al, 2000). Questions about induction & déduction, about causality and teleology,
about laws and determinism, about empiricism and rationalism, about truth and
growth of knowledge, about realism, etc are some examples. Ail of thèse are very
much linked together but can also be studied separately. Moreover, they are today
discussed in many scientific areas, from natural to social sciences. We are hère
interested in how thèse types of questions underpin and are introduced in the
resilience engineering approach.
Simultaneously, given the size of the paper many shortcuts are taken that might
leave some of the outlines a bit blurry for those who are not familiar with the
philosophical positions we introduce. For us, thèse are complex and evolving
philosophical topics, and we will never give crédit to their depth and subtleties in
few pages. Nonetheless, we however hope to make it clear to the reader, firstly, that
taking a philosophy of science perspective is of fundamental relevance for the
resilience engineering project and, secondly, that discussing resilience engineering
as realist or constructivist provide some interesting références for understanding and
developing the resilience engineering project. We are ourselves not philosophers but
believe in the importance of addressing philosophical questions in the context of
safety science and resilience engineering as any scientific approach is influenced by
its philosophical preconceptions.
2.2 Critical realism
On realism. In A realist theory of science (1975) and The Possibility of Naturalism
(1979) (PON) Roy Bhaskar distinguishes between intransitive (ontological) and
transitive (epistemological) objects and argues that it is essential that thèse
dimensions are clearly distinguished. The intransitive is that what is and so exists
independent of identification. It is based on the ontological claim that "If men ceased
to exist sound would continue to travel and heavy bodies fall to the earth in exactly
the same way, though ex hypothesi there would be no-one to know it. Let us call this,
in an unavoidable technical neologism, the intransitive objects of knowledge (...)
they are the real things and structures, mechanisms and processes, events and
possibilities of the world; and for the most part they are quite independent of us"
(Bhaskar, 1975). There are thus real entities and relationships that make up the
natural and social world. In contrast, the transitive dimension is a social product,
such as our knowledge and perception (concepts, models etc.) of reality (e.g. social
science). As Bhaskar said in an interview (Noms, 1999) " A realist theory of
science re-thematised ontology, argued for its necessity and irreductibility in any
account of science, and gave it a radically différent shape or context. In particular,
it is argued against the epistemic fallacy, that is the idea that one can reduce or
analyse knowledge in terms of being. It was argued that being was an absolutely
irréductible and necessary category." As its name suggests, critical realism involves
a critical dimension that acknowledges the fallibility of our knowledge. Thus, there
is no unquestionable foundation for science; knowledge is a social and historical
product and, as a conséquence, ail facts are theory-laden (Robson 2002). Bhaskar
(archer et al. 1998 p.xii) argues that Western philosophical traditions hâve
mistakenly reduced the question of what is to the question of what we can know and
conceptualises this blunder as the "epistemic fallacy". Critical realism présupposes
that théories, both natural and social, are alternative accounts of the same world, and
that there is a rational criterion for theory choice based on the possibility that one
theory can explain better or more significant mechanisms than another.
On social sciences. Critical realism is a movement that in relation to the social
sciences delivers a realist social ontology and addresses the epistemological
implications of this ontology for social science. According to critical realism, social
Systems hâve unique characteristics that must be dealt with conceptually in an
analytical dualism between agency and structure because; 1) social reality dépends
upon human activity and 2) social reality is transformable, but 3) as human agents,
we are not immutable because we are constrained and enabled by the society in
which we live and work (Archer 1995). The ontological premise for analytical
dualism is the notion of society's émergent properties, which, in terms of structure
and agency, is their interplay over time and space: [The ontological premise of
émergence] being so, then social realism implies a methodology based upon
analytical dualism where explanation of why things social are so and not otherwise
dépends upon an account of how the properties and powers of the 'people ' causally
intertwine with those of the 'parts' (Archer 1995 p. 15).
2.3 Radical constructivism
Constructivist is a rather fashionable term used in many différent domains (see
Hacking, 1999). Radical constructivism is the term given by Glasersfeld (1981) to
Piaget's constructivist approach of knowledge (1967, 1970). Glasersfeld interprets
Piaget's contribution to epistemology by radicalising the idea that there is no
possibility of describing a world as it is by separating between epistemology and
ontology. Ontology is not in the scope of this theory of knowledge. Ontology
belongs to the realm of metaphysics, and is outside the constructivist epistemology,
which describes a rational way of knowing. As Glasersefeld (1982) puts it "The
difficulty in explicating the radical constructivist epistemology springs above ail
from the fact that, from the very beginning of our Western philosophical traditions
epistemology has been tied to ontology. "Truth" and "objectivity" hâve an
unalterable meaning, once the impossible condition has been set that cognition
should lead to verifiable knowledge of a pre-established ontic reality." Therefore
"radical constructivism is intended as a model of rational knowing, not as a
metaphysics that attempts to describe a real world" (Glasersefeld, 1995).
Based on an analogy with biology and evolutionary theory, "truth" in constructivism
(following hère also ideas promoted by an instrumentalist approach of science
among which pragmatism) is replaced by "viability" or "fit" instead of a "match"
with the environment. Only the observer can judge of the experiential relevance of
his models given his/her purposes, and therefore not an objective criterion but rather
subjective ones (such as for example simplicity, generality, accuracy etc). This point
view is difficult to admit for realists convinced of a world existing independently of
them. To this, Glasersfeld (1995, p 52) clearly replies "Recently it has been
suggested that radical constructivism is contradictory because it attacks realism and
at the same time assumes a realist position by admitting that an ontological reality
must constrain human action. (...) In the usual language of philosophers, "realists"
are those who believe that they can obtain knowledge of a world as it is in itself.
This I deny, and admitting "ontic" constraints does not contradict it, because while
they may détermine what is impossible, they do not détermine the ways of acting and
thinking that can be constructed within them".
The constructivist approach of knowledge considers that models and théories are
viable (combining usefulness, purpose and cohérence) but not "true" in the common
sensé. Famous event in history in favour of this instrumentalist position is Osiander
préface of Copernicus treaty on heliocentrism. In order not to upset the religious
dogma held by institutions about the earth being at the centre of the universe
(geocentrism), Osiander indicated that the mathematical model of Copernicus did
not need to be true. It was a way of "saving the phenomenà" rather than providing
an accurate représentation of the world as it is. Within this perspective, it is
impossible to step out our human way of experiencing and perceiving the world in
order to compare it with an "objective" or a "true" picture of the world as it is. It is,
in a sensé, "agnostic" toward this spécifie metaphysical problem of ontology
(Riegler, 2001). This statement is met with much résistance and misunderstanding
from many. "The constructivist conclusion is unpopular. The most fréquent
objection takes the form of the accusation that constructivism dénies reality. But this
it does not. It only dénies that we can rationally know a reality beyond our
expérience. (...) From my point of view, the trouble is that most critics seem to be
unwilling to accept the explicit, programmatic statement that constructivism is a
theory of knowing, not of being. That a model of the construction of knowledge
could be designed without making ontological daims about what is known, is
apparently difficult to accept"'. (Glasersfeld, 2001, p lO).
2.4 Main différence between critical realism and radical constructivism
With thèse short présentations of the two positions as a background, we direct
attention to similarities and différences. Both critical realism and radical
constructivism indicate that it is important to distinguish epistemology from
ontology. However, their positions concerning this matter differ. Critical realism is a
realist theory of science asserting that there is a world existing independently of us
necessitating ontological developments to support this. Radical constructivism is a
model of rational way of knowing. But it does not commit to ontological position
because thèse concerns metaphysics rather than epistemology such as described in
its model of knowing based on expérience. An important différence is also found in
the lack of clear extension of radical constructivism in terms of social sciences,
whereas critical realism has extensively developed this side of its model. Récent
contributions regarding the application of radical constructivism to sociology are
however now available in Glasersfeld (2008).
3. APPLICATION TO EMPIRICAL RESEARCHES
3.1 Critical realism in aviation safety
In my research on aircraft maintenance and aviation safety I hâve found that the
activity of aircraft maintenance comprises an unofficial social system, documenting
unofficial actions and informai social structures within the workplace as
characteristic tendencies of work (Pettersen 2006; Pettersen & Aase 2008; Pettersen
2008). In this research I suggest that there is another side to what goes on in the
process of ensuring aircraft safety than what is described in formai descriptions of
work, which needs to be accounted for in applied théories of safety and accidents in
technological Systems (Pettersen et al. 2008). Following this, I argue that studying
normal functioning is essential because it encompasses the same conditions that
precondition ail forms of outcomes and events. However, as argued in Pettersen
(2008), data gathered from a spécifie background and made relatable to other areas
can only develop from being context-validated knowledge if it is related to a more
gênerai model of socio-technical functioning. This emphasises why the possibilities
of system meta-theory are so important and fondamental to socio-technical analysis
in the field of safety. i.e. it argues for the fundamental need to address ontology and
being clear on fundamental models, independently of possibility or goodness of a
spécifie set of ontological assumptions.
In order to contribute to the above, critical realist philosophy and social theory
developed within the critical realist approach (Bhaskar 1979; Archer 1995) has been
applied for analysing the relationship between individual actions and social
structures in aircraft maintenance emphasising how thèse properties contribute to the
production of safety (Pettersen et al. 2008; Pettersen 2008). This research has
strengthened an argument for a social conception of technological Systems and
provides a basis for categorising différent social science approaches to such Systems.
Through this research critical realism is argued to hold a largely unused potential for
meeting many of the current objectives and requirements of socio-technical safety
research and management.
3.2 Radical constructivism in applied safety researches for the Chemical
industry
Radical constructivism as I understood it, has proved to be very helpful the
researches I hâve been involved in. I hâve tried to explain such a position in the field
of accidents investigations (Le Coze, 2008a) but it is also appropriate for research in
normal functioning (Le Coze & Dupré, 2006, 2008) . Because within a radical
constructivist perspective a model is assessed according to its viability based on
expérience, appreciating its relevance is impossible without making clear what its
purpose is. How much "true" is the model is therefore a matter of how viable it is.
This is important in an applied research on organisational safety. As outsider of the
system that I studied, I will not in the end implement the actions required in order to
transform it. Insiders will potentially do. A radical constructivist approach of this
problem would therefore insists on the importance of taking into account the
background and expériences of insiders and the adequacy of the model according to
thèse backgrounds and expériences. If the purpose is to improve safety thanks to
organisational measures implemented by individuals, then the model produced needs
to be viable within the context of its use. It is what Starbuck (2006, 165) says
"Social scientists who believe they hâve something valuable to say to contribute
hâve to be willing to persuade others of this value; and to do that, they hâve to adapt
their manuscripts to the perceptual framework of potential readers". Thereforc, with
a radical constructivist point of view, describing from an outsider point of view the
way safety is organisationally produced will not be sufficient (i.e. HRO
descriptions), although viable within a particular community of people (i.e.
researchers in social sciences). This is a point that LaPorte (2006, 151) made very
clear "Researchers in this field assert that identification of the characteristics of
highly reliable organisations is not the same thing as knowing as to make them so".
It means that making organisations safer does not consist in simply applying results
from more descriptive models. This position rather implies spécifie research designs,
designs allowing actionable models to be produced through interactive work
between researchers with practitioners and tested in real situations (i.e. action
research type of approach).
4. THE RELEVANCE OF THESE APPROACHES FOR
RESILIENCE ENGINEERING
4.1 Resilience engineering and critical realism
It is clear, both from the basic concepts and precepts of resilience engineering
(Hollnagel et al. 2006) and the work that has evolved following thèse foundations
(Hollnagel et al. 2008), that resilience engineering differs from traditional
approaches to safety that focus on failures as isolated cases. It explains instead
safety and accidents as dynamic outeomes of normal functioning of socio-technical
Systems. By so doing, resilience engineering shifts focus from actual events to
underlying facts and mechanisms of Systems that are driving the functioning of
socio-technical Systems. However, refocusing the attention on System functioning is
not only about making the statement, but developing a consistent approach of how
this is in fact possible. This is where critical realism does hold some substantial
potential as a philosophical référence.
Currently, critical realism is not applied widely in the field of safety and socio-
technical theorising. However, two well known accident théories in the field,
Turner's (1978) theory of Man-Made Disasters and Diane Vaughan's Normalisation
of Déviance (1996), can be argued as commensurable with critical realist theorising
(Pettersen 2008). However, I would also ad, the socio-technical models argued for in
Hollnagel et al. (2006; 2008) may share this commensurability. At a fundamental
level the critical realist epistemology comprising an analytical dualism between
structure and agency seems to be central to the socio-technical theorising developed
in resilience engineering as it delivers an explanation of the basic relationships
between individuals and their social environment that addresses the relationship
between stability and change in Systems (McDonald 2006). There is thus a
fundamental potential in critical realism in relation to what it contributes to the
possibility and potential for modelling technological Systems that hâve relevance for
the Resilience Engineering project.
In summary, fundamental gains can be made by looking deeper into how critical
realism may inform the resilience engineering approach to system modelling, how
the critical realist conception of social causality may inform resilience and the
applied theory of émergence (Hollnagel et al. 2006) as well as how resilience
engineering defines it self in terms of a methodological project.
4.2 Resilience engineering and radical constructivism
Given what has been said about radical constructivism in the previous sections, it
will be found that the following sentence (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006) is very close
to it. "A model that is cumbersome and costly to use will from the very start be at
disadvantage, even if from an académie point of view it provides a better
explanation. This should, however, not lead to the conclusions that we must give up
on models and try to describe reality as it is, since this is a philosophically naïve
notion." And a note is added to comment on the use of "better": "Better is, of course
a dangerous term to use since it implies that some objective criterion or standard
available. Although there is no truth to be used as a point of référence, it is possible
to show that one explanation - under given conditions - may be better than another,
e.g., in providing more effective countermeasure" Hollnagel & Woods (2006 p.
353). By questioning the notion of reality as it is, and by introducing an example of
purpose {"providing more effective countermeasure") against which the relevance of
the model can be assessed instead of an objective external criteria, this sentence
favours a radical constructivist approach of resilience engineering. It can be noted
that such a relationship between resilience engineering and radical constructivism
would not be surprising as "engineering" in the expression is clearly associated with
the search for practical relevance. In management sciences, "actionable knowledge"
(as a définition of models aiming at practical purposes), has gained strong support
from philosophies of knowledge (such as pragmatism1 or constructivism, Avenier,
2007).
5. CONCLUSION: IS RESILIENCE ENGINEERING REALIST
OR CONSTRUCTIVIST?
This paper resuit from the confrontation of two philosophical perspectives, based on
différent expériences of researches in the field of safety. One author found critical
realism to provide a good framework for his research. The second authors found
radical constructivist theory of knowledge as a useful approach for the questions that
came up throughout his projects. The two perspectives are however quite différent
and imply différent positions with regard to ontology and epistemology. Choosing
one over the other can be linked to personal conviction and beliefs. There are in fact
no definite answers as both positions are still hotly debated in philosophy. However,
subscribing to one or the other led to différent conclusion when applied first to our
researches, then translated to resilience engineering issues. Critical realist suggested
to consider the importance of social System ontology (in particular the dualism of
structure and agency) and this has implications for méthodologies. Radical
constructivist stressed the importance to put the viability of models (usefulness,
purpose and value) into tests within their spécifie context of use, and consequently
to create the proper research conditions to do so (such as action research). What we
find interesting is that philosophical questions often seem as inconsequential to
practical problems. On the contrary, they reveal hère to hâve concrète implications.
See for example the conférence thème of the academy of management, 2004, using as an introductive
sentence James pragmatic principle 'Truth in our ideas means their power to work."
ThLs exploratory paper would need to be dcveloped further in order to better ground
thèse implications, we for example think that the conséquences of the two positions
might not exclude each other. But it is a first step.
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